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The last decade has seen a series of significant innovations in the way Parliament holds government to account,
mostly involving the House of Commons, but in some cases the House of Lords as well. They include:
More resources for select committees;
The introduction of ‘core tasks’ for select committees in the Commons setting out their work objectives;
More select committees in both houses, holding more inquiries and producing more reports;
The Prime Minister holding twice-annual oral evidence sessions with the House of Commons Liaison
Committee, which comprises the chairs of the various Commons select committees;
The introduction of public bill committees for more effective legislative scrutiny in the Commons;
Greater transparency for executive financial accountability to Parliament;
A Commons backbench business committee, to some extent loosening the grip of the executive, via the
whips, on the Commons timetable;
Elections for Commons committee members and chairs, again lessening the influence of the whips;
Pre-appointment hearings by Commons committees for preferred candidates for major public appointments;
and
The placing of powers previously exercised under the extra-parliamentary Royal Prerogative on a statutory
basis, making Parliament the ultimate authority. Most notably, the Civil Service is now regulated by an Act of
Parliament.
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This significant series of changes has not disrupted a powerful and longstanding public narrative of an ever-weaker
Commons and Parliament, populated by pliable executive stooges. However, in an important article in the latest
edition of the British Journal of Politics and International Relations, [1] Professor Matthew Flinders (University of
Sheffield) and Dr Alexandra Kelso (University of Southampton) challenge this widely-held ‘Parliamentary Decline
Thesis’ (PDT).
Flinders and Kelso argue that part of the responsibility for this failure to recognise genuine change lies with the
academic community, although there are some notable exceptions, as they rightly points out. (The dissenters from
the PDT include Professor Phil Cowley, of the University of Nottingham, whose work charts the long-term rise of
rebelliousness amongst MPs, and Dr Meg Russell, of the Constitution Unit, who has demonstrated the growing
assertiveness and effectiveness of the Lords in recent years).
Flinders and Kelso deploy the concepts of the ‘expectations gap’ and the ‘perception gap’ to explain this
phenomenon. Scholary studies throughout the twentieth century have encouraged the public to expect more of
Parliament as an autonomous institution than it has been able, or realistically ever could be able, to provide. At the
same time, consequent levels of cynicism mean that there is an unwillingness to accept genuine enhancements to
the practice and effectiveness of parliamentary accountability when they have occurred.
A key point here – brought out well by Flinders and Kelso – is that the parliamentary system in the UK is configured
in such a way as to create a systemic disposition towards strong government. If we judge our arrangements for
executive-legislative interactions using the principle of ‘separation of powers’ (a flawed concept anyway), they will
inevitably appear wanting; and would have done at any point in history, contrary to the PDT notion of some kind of
lost ‘golden age’ of parliamentary government.
In the UK, government has no direct democratic mandate (except over the small number of issues on which it holds
referendums) and is founded in the confidence of the House of Commons, from which most ministers are drawn.
Consequently, the government of the day normally has an inbuilt majority in the senior House of Parliament. (Indeed
a majority of at least 20 MPs is virtually a pre-requisite for a UK government to function over a full Parliamentary
2/3
term. And, in practice, government majorities are usually significantly larger).
In this context, reforms – such as those listed above – are only ever likely to lead to marginal increases in
accountability. Often they involve enhancements to the practices of select committees on which the governing party
or parties possess a majority. Most of the time they will lead to gentle prodding of the government, rather than
outright warfare.
And we should also note – as Flinders and Kelso remind us to – Professor Anthony King’s observation of the
importance of ‘intra-party and intra-parliamentary relationships’, not focusing exclusively on ‘executive-legislative
relations’. Many of the most important negotiations, deals and concessions involving backbenchers and government
take place in party groups, away from public, formal parliamentary processes. They may not be noticed, but they are
important.
These kinds of engagements are even more complex – and probably even more important – in the circumstances of
a Coalition, with two different sets of ministers and backbenchers involved. Often, ministers will not even attempt to
bring forward proposals if they feel they will prove too controversial with their own parliamentary followers. Tony
Blair, for instance, would probably have tried to be more radical than he was over public service reform, if he had
thought his party would wear it. Of course such impacts are hard to measure, probably another reason why they are
not taken into account in the simplistic PDT.
If the UK wants a system which it has never had, in which executive and legislature have separate mandates and
more overt clashes over policy which Parliament is seen often to win, then that is a deliberate – and substantial –
constitutional reform decision to be taken. In the meantime, we need to consider the performance of Parliament
within its own constitutional framework.
Looked at in this way, the improvements which have been made in recent years become more apparent, and there
is greater chance for a more realistic approach to solving the difficulties Parliament undoubtedly faces (which range
from the long-term growth in the quantity of secondary legislation that Parliament must process to the increasing
size of the ministerial ‘payroll vote’). The problems are real; the PDT risks being little more than an unhelpful
distraction from them.
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